Why did the plotters of the counter coup of July 1966
release Obafemi Awolowo from prison? What role did this play in
whittling the position of Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu? What did Awolowo
offer Ojukwu that was outside of secession but which the latter turned
down? You will read this and many more in today’s last but one series.
The question is: if Ojukwu signed the warrant, how did the
effectuation of the warrant wait for so long until it coincided with the
order given by Lt.Col Yakubu Gowon at the head of the revenge coup, for
Awolowo to be released? This is an important question because Awolowo
was not released until seven months after the first coup of the year.
The historic task fell upon the revenge coup makers who had toppled
General Aguiyi Ironsi after a rigorously organized pogrom against the
Igbo, with a number of other Southerners added to the kill. It was
certainly to gain a wider base than their Northern security ambitions
allowed that the release of Awolowo from Calabar Prison was announced.
It leaves a sneaking feeling that Ojukwu’s powers over the Eastern
Region, to which all Igbo in the Nigerian diaspora had to return in
search of a safe haven, had not yet become so all-pervasive as to be
able to countermand a swiftly executed decision by Federal authorities
intent on releasing Awolowo from jail. Nor would it have been politic
for Ojukwu, even if he had the power, to attempt to prevent Awolowo from
being released after a Federal order to that effect. It would have
amounted to holding Awolowo hostage. Could it be said then that in order
not to fall into the role of hostage taker, Lt. Colonel Odumegwu
Ojukwu, as Military Governor of the Eastern Region carried out an order
initiated by a Federal Military Government that he had so flagrantly
repudiated? Whatever is the case, it was the release that enabled
Awolowo to participate in the discussions to resolve the crisis through
sundry Leaders of Thought Meetings up till Awolowo’s peace-hunt to Enugu
before the first shot in the Civil war was fired.
It may well be added that it was Awolowo’s participation in Gowon’s
administration that enabled him to get a copy of the Ifeajuna
manuscript.
A copy was sent to him by a well-wisher who thought he should know
about the plans that the January 15 1966 coup makers had had in store
for him. It was in similar fashion that he got a copy of the transcripts
of the Enugu meeting after the tapes were said to have been captured at
the fall of Enugu and the take over of the Eastern Nigerian
Broadcasting service by Federal Forces. Awolowo had the two documents in
safe keeping when I became his Private (Political) Secretary in June
1978. They were among the many papers, not part of the main body of his
library, which he had to bring out for my education to help my work as
his “involved and committed researcher”, as he requested for in his
newspaper advert for the job.
I read the documents as part of many such efforts to induct me into
the job. I was authorized to make copies for a number of party officials
and stalwarts as a means of education in preparation for the battles
that the newly formed Unity Party of Nigeria was expected to face in the
Second Republic. So let me put it this way: that I read the full text
of the Ifeajuna manuscript within three months of my new job. The other
document, the transcript of his meeting with Ojukwu, was a typescript
that had to be cyclostyled in order for many more copies to be made in
preparation for the controversies that we expected to confront in the
course of the 1979 election.

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